Social programs and labor status
Types of firms' relationships with workers Types of firms' relationships with workers In Mexico's institutional framework social security is a right of salaried workers only (having a boss and being paid a wage). All firms hiring salaried workers have to enroll them in social security regardless of income level. On the other hand, non-salaried workers have access to various social protection programs. Non-salaried workers can be selfemployed or be in a non-wage contractual arrangement with firms.
Social protection for non-salaried workers 1. Benefits are unbundled [+] . Its costs are:
T i = [health insurance + retirement pensions + housing loans + day care centers + …].
2. Workers may also value benefits at less than their costs, so that . Hence, the utility of a nonsalaried job is:
3. Benefits are paid from general revenues and are conditional on being informal. Formal workers salaried and registered with IMSS, Infonavit and Consar; legal.
Informal workers (i) salaried and non-registered, i.e., illegal.
(ii) comisionistas and self-employed, legal.
Formal firms hiring salaried workers and registered with IMSS; legal.
Informal firms (i) hiring non-salaried workers (i.e., comisionista); legal.
(ii) hiring salaried workers but not registered with IMSS (and SAT for tax purposes); illegal.
The informal sector is heterogeneous, partly legal and partly illegal.
The formal sector is homogeneous and all legal.
Social and economic implications of the formal-informal dichotomy:
Social Economic
•Workers of similar abilities get different social benefits.
•Protection from risks are different.
•Contracting problems in insurance markets only solved for some.
•The composition of consumption only changed for some.
•Workers of similar abilities have different productivity.
•Firms face different labor costs.
•Social security and social protection have different fiscal implications.
•Rates of return on investments modified.
•Potential impact on savings.
In this context, profit and utility maximization by firms and workers, respectively, results in lower aggregate productivity and lower growth. And social objectives are very imperfectly accomplished. There are two wedges: one between the costs to firms and the benefits to workers in salaried labor; and one between the costs to firms and the benefits to workers in non-salaried labor. However, both act in the same direction: taxing salaried employment and subsidizing non-salaried employment.
Distortions in labor costs

Composition of the labor force, 2006
Formal 38%
Informal 58%
Salaried 57%
Non-salaried 40%
Unemployed 4%
Informal employment has a legal and an illegal component.
Workers mobility: IMSS registries
1) Large data base with 9.2 million registries of the "1997 generation" that records formal and non-formal status during 10 years along with age, gender and wage.
2) Enlarged data base with 26 million registries of the "1997-2006" generations.
I follow one generation's entry and exit into formality for a decade. I then compare 1997-2006 worker vs. job flows. Compared to high wage workers, low wage workers enter more often into formality. The problem is not entering formality; the problem is that, for whatever reasons, low wage workers enter and exit more than high wage. The number of workers entering formality exceeds by more than twice those who are in formality. Entry into formality is not the problem.
1997-2006 generation: worker flows vs. job flows
With formal-informal mobility:
Ignoring preferences for work based on hierarchy, flexibility and innate abilities, the labor market is best described by:
But from the point of view of firms the situation is different. Those hiring salaried labor pay for social security; the rest do not. So (cost of formal labor) / (cost of informal labor)….. This ratio exceeds one; it is probably around 1.5. Note that it increases with resources channeled to social protection programs. The average wage of low wage workers who move between sectors is not statistically different. This suggests that the value to them of social security and social protection benefits is similar.
The Labor Market without Social Programs The Labor Market with Incomplete Valuation of Social Security
Unless social security is fully valued by workers, it acts as a tax on salaried employment. Note that social security contributions are paid by all workers.
The Labor Market with Social Security and Social Protection
Social protection programs act like a subsidy to non-salaried employment.
Empirical Estimates of the Static Efficiency Costs
Assuming w f = w i = 26.6 (from evidence in Chapter Five)
T f = 9.31 pesos (26.6*0.35) 9.31 pesos per worker * 2,080 hours per year = 9,682 pesos per worker 9,682 * 8.1 million workers (ΔL) = Annual GDP loss from lower labor productivity
78.4 billion pesos, or 0. Approximately 75% of all firms in Mexico are illegal; this excludes activities in the streets and rural areas. Only 1.1% of all firms have more than 50 employees. 
Informality shifts downwards the size distribution of firms.
Firms' demand for labor under illegality
Firms chose optimally between legal and illegal workers 2. The probability of being fined depends on size and proportion 3. For some ranges of employment firms mix legal and illegal workers
The Demand for Legal and Illegal Labor 
Legal status matters for productivity:
• Firms equate the expected MCL to them to the MPL. U i = U j is consistent with MPL i <>MPL j . With labor mobility worker's utilities are equalized, not productivities.
• Some firms only hire illegal workers, some mix legal and illegal, and some only legal. The MPL is different in each case ranging from w if to (w f + T f ). Thus, workers with similar abilities have different productivities.
Productivity growth is more difficult under informality • Fanjzylber et al. (2006) show that less than 10% of micro and small firms receive credit or participate in labor training programs in Mexico.
• Lopez-Acevedo and Tan (2006) show that small and micro firms in Mexico are between one fifth and one sixth less likely than large firms to invest in worker's training.
• Lopez-Acevedo (2006) finds that small firms in Mexico are substantially less likely to adopt new technology than large firms. 
Investment Options in New or Existing Firms
Informality impacts the allocation of investment.
